We study a mixed oligopoly market in which firms choose the capacities and prices sequentially in an uncertain environment with differentiated products. If the products of the firms are substitutable and realized demand is higher (lower) than expected demand, we find that both firms hold under (excess) capacity. In the case of medium realized demand, private firm choses under capacity but public firm holds excess capacity. If the products are complements and realized demand is high (low) enough, both firms hold under (excess) capacity. Whenever realized demand is conformable with expectations, private and public firms hold under capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, we encounter more and more with a different type of oligopoly called mixed oligopoly where both public and private firms compete. Especially, this type of oligopolies are common in transportation industries, oil industries and telecommunications. The existence of mixed capacity choice … under demand uncertainty oligopolies appears to be very significant in the sectors where privatization efforts just began to take place. In a mixed oligopoly, at least one firm is public firm and such firms aim to maximize public welfare. There are also profit maximizing private firms and public firms have to compete with these public firms within different agendas. Currently, mixed oligopolies become to more and more important and the capacity choice and pricing behavior of firms in mixed oligopolies attract attention of many scholars.
Capacity and quantity choice of firms are investigated in Spence (1977) , Dixit (1980 ), Tirole (1988 , and Bau & Singh (1990) . However, these studies do not touch upon the issue of mixed oligopolies. On the other hand, Cremer et al. (1989 ), De Fraja & Delbono (1989 , Nett (1993) , Anderson et al. (1997) , and White (1997) (2007) focus on the capacity choice problem in a mixed oligopoly when firms compete on prices.
In this study, we analyze sequential choice of capacity and price for a mixed oligopoly in an uncertain environment with differentiated products.
II. MODEL
We consider price-setting competition between a private firm, firm 1, and a social welfare maximizing public firm, firm 2, under uncertain demand, and with differentiated products. There are n states of Nature and in state k, each firm faces an inverse demand of the following form: , = a k − p i,k + bp j,k i, j = 1,2; i ≠ j and k = 1, … , n
where q i,k is quantity produced of firm i, , is the corresponding price and q j,k is the quantity produced of the competitor firm j at state k. Demand parameter a k > 0 takes a different value in each state, a k < a k+1 , k = 1, … , (n − 1), which leads common demand uncertainty in the mixed duopoly market. The probability of each state is denoted by , where The cost function is assumed to be U-shaped and is given by
where x i represents production capacity of firm i. This form of cost function implies that the long-run average cost is minimized when quantity produced is equal to the firm's production capacity. Moreover, to simplify the analysis, marginal cost is assumed to be zero.
Both firms are risk-neutral. The private firm maximizes its profit, while public firm maximizes social welfare, defined as the sum of firms' profits and consumer surplus. In the first stage, firms simultaneously decide their capacity levels before realization of uncertain demand. In the second stage, demand uncertainty is resolved and firms choose output.
Last, the following constraint guaranteeing positive quantities, prices and capacities in equilibrium completes the model: 8(24 + 12 − 18 2 − 9 3 + 4 ) (7 + 8)( 4 − 18 2 + 24) < ∑ =1
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and start out by considering the second stage of the game. In the second stage, each firm maximizes its objective function taking capacity level as
given. The private firm, firm 1, maximizes the following profit function with respect to 1 .
Solving FOC produces the following reaction function of the private firm:
The objective of the welfare maximizing public firm is to maximize summation of its own profit, the profit of the private firm and the consumer surplus.
capacity choice … under demand uncertainty
Deriving FOC with respect to p 2 , and solving it yields the following best response function of the public firm:
From (3) and (5), we obtain both firms' price choices in terms on exogenous variables and given capacity levels 
Equations (6) and (7) imply that each firm's price choice is negatively depended to its own production capacity, regardless of whether products are substitutes or complements. Yet, price choice is positively depended to its competitor's installed capacity level if products are complements and positively depended if products are substitutes. Moreover, compared to the private firm's price choice, the public firm's price decision is less responsive to the competitor's installed capacity. This is because the public firm values private firm's profit and consumer surplus besides its own profit.
In the first stage, firms simultaneously decide capacity levels in order to maximize their objective functions. Solving FOCs yields following best response functions: 
Best response functions indicate that in the case of substitute products if one firm increases its capacity, the competitor reacts by lowering its capacity. Conversely, in the case of complement products, if one firm increases its capacity, the competitor reacts by decreasing its capacity. Another result that stems from (8) and (9) is that compared to the private firm, the public firm is less 
Substituting (10) and (11) into price equations (6) and (7), we obtain Comparison of firm prices indicate that private firm charges higher price than does the public firm, as expected. In addition, the difference between firm prices increases as the product substitutability decreases. The reason behind this result is that since the welfare maximizing-public firm takes consumer surplus into account, it behaves less aggressively when product complementarity increases. Now, we proceed by deriving equilibrium quantities. From equations (10) and (12), we can obtain capacity and quantity differences, which lead us with the main result of the paper. When the realized demand is medium, the private firm holds under capacity, whereas the public firm holds excess capacity.
When demand is sufficiently high or low than the expected demand, the effect of uncertainty dominates strategic effect and so both firms hold under capacity and excess capacity, respectively.
This result is in line with Lu & Poddar (2006) . However, if demand realization is in the medium range and is closer to the expected demand the strategic choice dominates the uncertainty effect. In this case, the private holds under capacity in order to increase its price and reduce competition. On the other hand, social welfare maximizing public firm chooses excess capacity in order to increase industry output, weakens competition and increase consumer surplus. The result obtained in this case is the opposite of that Lu & Poddar (2006) derived in quantity competition.
The next table presents results obtained for complement products and the following proposition summarizes findings for this case. Similar to the case in substitute products, high or low realization of demand leads both firms to hold under and over capacity, respectively. When demand is medium, the effect of demand uncertainty weakens, and the strategic effect becomes more prominent. (6) and (7) show that price choices of both firms are positively and so quantity produced is negatively depended to the competitor's installed capacity. Since products are complements, each firm has incentive to hold under capacity in order to increase the opponent's quantity produced.
Equations (6) and (7) imply that each firm's price choice is negatively depended to its own production capacity, regardless of whether products are substitutes or complements. Yet, price choice is positively depended to its competitor's installed capacity level if products are complements and positively depended if products are substitutes. Moreover, compared to the private firm's price choice, the public firm's price decision is less responsive to the competitor's installed capacity.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this study, we analyze sequential choice of capacity and price in a mixed oligopoly context. Different from prior studies, we use an uncertain environment with differentiated products to uncover capacity choice problem. If realized demand is higher (lower) than expected demand, the uncertainty effect becomes dominant and both firms hold under (excess) capacity in the case of substitute products. On the other hand, uncertainty effect loses its dominance when realized demand is medium. In this case, private firm choses under capacity but public firm aims to increase consumer surplus utilizing over capacity.
When products are complements, our results become slightly different. In the case of complement products, both firms hold under (excess) capacity if the realized demand is high (low) enough. But, the results become quite different compared to the case of substitute products if the realized demand is in harmony with expected demand i.e. it is medium. If such a case is under consideration, both private and public firms hold under capacity. Indeed utilizing under capacity, firms tend to force each other to produce more.
